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In this paper, I first introduce the question of actors’ vs analysts’ categories. I then provide an 
explication of the concept of an approach that captures the use of the term by scientists and will be 
useful for philosophers, historians, and sociologists of science to analyze research in the empirical 
sciences. For this purpose, I lay out some preliminaries for a successful explication, provide a 
definition as the core of the explication, and assess the adequacy of the suggested explication. 
Finally, I point out some historical, sociological, and philosophical dimensions of approaches that can 
be addressed by means of the analytic category introduced by means of the explication. 
From actor‘s categories to analysts’ categories 
The term “approach” is an actors’ term - researchers routinely speak of “approaches”. They promote 
their approach in their writings and distinguish it from other approaches in their field. A commonly 
used term does not always indicate an actors’ category, that is, a concept shared by those using the 
term. I will argue here that in the case of the term “approach” this is indeed the case, however, and 
that explicating the underlying concept is useful for the historical, philosophical, and sociological 
analysis of science. 
Historians or sociologists identify actors’ categories in an attempt to describe the cultural and social 
worlds of the communities they analyze. These categories are presumably important units in the 
cognitive and social practice of the actors in that community, but they are not necessarily most 
relevant regarding the epistemic aims of the analysts in terms of the explanations and classifications, 
or the general understanding of historical and social processes sought. Analysts thus use their own 
concepts to further characterize the functions of the units identified in the worlds of the analyzed 
community. This practice always bears the risk of anachronism, epistemic imperialism, and other 
ways of imposing the categories of the analyst’s cultural and social world on the analyzed world. Yet, 
bringing in concepts attuned to the analyst’s epistemic aims seems unavoidable and when the terms 
are well defined and the categories construed as generic, i.e., as applying to all societies and 
communities, then the practice is widely seen as acceptable – but assessments differ, of course, 
within and among practitioners of history, sociology, or anthropology. 
Analytic categories, even if they become seen as generically applicable, are typically originally 
derived from the cultural and social worlds of the analysts, that is, they often were categories 
recognized by actors in the broader communities in which the practice of analysis emerged. For 
example, generic categories such as power as used by Western sociology emerged from 
conceptualization of social relations in Western societies, but is now widely seen as universally 
applicable. Accordingly, it can be assumed that also actors’ categories of a community under analysis 
can in principle ascent to become analytic categories used by analysts looking at a community from 
outside. 
A given term might be used to refer to very different situations by the actors in an analyzed 
community. Identifying an actors’ category then requires separating the various meanings. Turning it 
into an analytic tool, furthermore, requires selecting one meaning, preferably such that it covers 
 
1 Draft manuscript based on a talk presented at the virtual Biennial Meeting of the International Society for the 
History, Philosophy, and Social Studies of Biology (ISHPSSB), 2021, hosted by Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory 
(CSHL). I thank the participants of the session “Actors and actors' categories in history, philosophy, and social 
studies of biology” for their comments. 
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several specialized uses of the term. Additionally, analysts will connect the concept such derived to 
several other analytic categories that they use routinely, which might or might not originate from the 
language of the analyzed community, in order align it with the epistemic goals of their analysis. 
When philosophers of science turn to a vague concept used by scientists, they often aim to explicate 
the concept. This procedure can be applied both, to concepts referring to natural objects, properties, 
or processes, as well as to methodological or epistemic categories, such as explanation. Typically, the 
aim of explication is the improvement of a conceptual system and hence it is often taken to have 
normative implications for the scientists, whose use of the concept is analyzed. However, also when 
a concept is transformed from an actors’ category to and analysts’ category and is meant to serve 
only the conceptual needs of the analyst, without necessary implying consequences for the original 
users of the concept, the procedure of concept formation (separate and select meanings; connect 
concepts to others) is similar to explication. Thus, I suggest philosophical explication here as a 
method for obtaining analytic categories from actors’ categories. While in this case explication not 
necessarily has normative implications for the actors, it has normative force for other analysts who 
wish to follow the analyst who introduced an actors’ term into the analytic language of their 
community – but there is also always room for fellow analysts to improve or replace the suggested 
explication. 
Explication: Preliminaries 
Before giving an explication of “approach”, some preliminaries are in order (Cordes and Siegwart 
n.d.): 
1) This is about the use of the term “approach” by scientists since the beginning of the 20th century 
and potentially by philosophers of science or other science studies scholars – the explication is not 
meant to apply to other contexts of use. 
2) Explication is required and justified for the analyst, because the use of the term by scientists is not 
tailored to the epistemic aims and discursive habits of philosophers and other scholars of science. An 
explication might also be useful for scientists themselves, in order to improve their methodological 
discourse. But an explication for this purpose might look differently. 
3) The explication suggested here is meant to serve an integrated history, philosophy, and social 
studies of science agenda. But these science studies disciplines might have different needs and 
sometimes require an explication with different emphasis.  
4) The use of “approach” by researchers is vague and ambiguous. For instance, “approach” is 
sometimes used to refer to theoretical accounts, sometimes for methods (and here also on various 
levels of generality); sometimes it is used broadly to indicate the specific character of one discipline 
vis a vis another; sometimes narrowly to refer to the particular work of a researcher or group. 
5) When researchers speak of approaches, they do not speak of their subject matter (natural objects 
or processes), but about how to study it; approach is thus a methodological concept.  
6) In many cases, “approach” seems to be used synonymously with “method”. However, the term 
“method” is used for many things on many levels, from the use of an instrument to an inductive 
procedure. I will argue here that while an approach is characterized by a method, the term 
“approach” refers to more than method. 
CC BY-NC-ND 4.0   3 
 
7) Most often researchers speak of “an approach to the problem of xyz”, but sometimes they use 
other formulations such as “an approach to the phenomenon of xyz”.2 
8) As mentioned, an explication should involve analysts’ categories – some generic, such as 
“community”, some derived from other actors’ categories, such as “experimental system”. An 
explication will also describe the place of the concept in question in the discourse of the actors 
whose cultural practice is analyzed. This then might require further explication of other categories 
used by these actors (leading to a potentially endless string of explications to reconstruct the 
language of the analyzed community). In this case the terms “problem” and “method” will be central, 
which are also actors’ terms, and which are used in a vague and ambiguous manner as well. 
However, as the is already more philosophical literature on these categories, they can be 
characterized in the context of the explication of “approach” without providing a full explication of 
these terms.    
9) Regarding previous work, it should be mentioned that Ken Waters (2004) has characterized the 
special case of the genetic approach pursued by the Morgan school as an “investigative strategy”, 
which could be applied to many problems. While Waters does not provide a full explication, it will be 
seen that my conception is emphasizing different aspects. 
With these preliminaries in place, a definition can be suggested in order to introduce the concept of 
an approach into the language of analysts of science working with the spectrum of history, 
philosophy and social studies of science. 
Explication: What is an approach? 
If “approach” is the explicandum, the vague term used by researchers, I suggest as explicatum the 
following definition:  
Def: A practice constitutes an (novel) approach if it constitutes an (novel) alignment of a problem and 
a method.  
As the explication should help to identify and distinguish approaches it makes sense to think of the 
definition in terms of novel approaches. Developing a novel approach then is a reciprocal and 
iterative process of interpreting a problem, such that it can be addressed by a specific method and 
simultaneously to assemble a method that can be used to address the problem such interpreted.  
To specify further, method as understood here has two components, an abstract study design or 
what I call a methodological schema (Meunier 2019) and a material research system that can 
implement the design – in many cases this will be an experimental system (Rheinberger 1997), but it 
might also be a field observation setting or a computer simulation. An example of a simple 
methodological schema in genetics could be MUTAGENESIS AND SUBSEQUENT PHENOTYPIC 
SCREENING which might be seen as sub-type of the more general schema that Claude Bernard called 
“experiment by destruction” (Bernard 1957, p. 8). The schema could be implemented in an 
experimental system comprising a model organism, x-ray mutagenesis, and an apparatus for 
measuring, say, behavioral phenotypes. 
A problem as the term is used here is shared by a community and hence often rather unspecific. A 
problem is not always puzzle to be solved, but often simply a research topic. But in the empirical 
sciences the formulation of a problem carves out a domain of phenomena. Phenomena might be 
recognized as part of a pre-scientific rendering of the world or in terms of previous scientific 
 
2 A Google Scholar search for these phrases, for instance, shows a marked difference with 19.000 hits for "an 
approach to the problem" and only 450 for "an approach to the phenomenon". 
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conceptualization. “What are the causes of behavior?” might be such a problem shared by the 
communities of psychologists and ethologists at a given time. 
To interpret a problem means to develop a more specific and answerable question (cf. Elliott 2020). 
Such a question can be derived by applying an abstract goal schema to the problem, which specifies a 
kind of outcome, that is a kind of thing that can be known about the phenomena, such as “Which 
parts does it have?”; “How are the parts located relative to each other?”; “Which mechanism 
constitutes the phenomenon?”; “How can its instances be classified?” etc. (Meunier 2019). As a 
problem carves out a domain of phenomena such specification according to a goal involves choosing 
specific aspects of a phenomenon as relevant. 
The interpretation of problems and the assembly of methods are coordinated by the fact that goal 
schemata and methodological schemata are often cognitively associated according to the respective 
socialization of researchers. They can be more or less specific, and they can be combined into more 
complex goals and associated ways to achieve the kind outcome specified in the goal schema.  
Approaches thus understood provide material and representational access to phenomena. To 
approach a phenomenon means to bring oneself in a position to interact with it. This is in some sense 
a generalization of Rheinberger’s (1997) account of epistemic objects in an experimental system. By 
applying an experimental or observational method to a phenomenon specified in a certain way, 
objects (broadly conceived) are differentiated and relations obtaining between them are singled out; 
thereby objects and relations are made accessible for interaction, as well as for reference of concepts 
or images. 
It is important to note that approaches are typically an outcome of a research process, not the 
starting point – the alignment is the result of an iterative process, and this implies that goals which 
are derived from applying goal schemata to problems can change! 
Finally, approaches are realized in individual research projects, which are historical episodes in which 
an individual or a group addresses a problem with the aim to deliver some result. So, developing an 
approach is often the same process as designing a research project. Addressing the process as 
project design, however, emphasizes its dependence on and sensitivity to the material and social 
dimensions of local research settings. Speaking of the development of an approach instead, puts the 
focus on an abstraction from the concrete implementation: Approaches are seen as universally 
applicable to a type of problem. Other researchers can pick up an approach and transfer it to their 
own project, situated in different material and social settings. 
Explication: Criteria for adequacy 
Classical criteria for adequacy of explications according to Carnap (1950) and others are similarity, 
regularity, fruitfulness, and simplicity. Prima facie, the explication of approach suggested here is 
simple enough, provided that the brief discussion of the concepts of problem and method are 
sufficient. I would also claim that the definition at the core of the explication captures the use of the 
term by researchers in most cases and could replace the term.3 In this respect it is important to point 
out that the definition is scalable. It captures very coarse problem-method alignments that scientists 
point to when contrasting disciplines, as much as those that constitute idiosyncratic research 
projects. Finally, I believe that my abbreviated explications of the terms of the explicatum, that is of 
“problem” and “method” guarantee a regular use of the explicatum. 
 
3 This is of course an empirical question and should be shown by discussing at least a few examples that can be 
argued to be representative. 
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So let me then say just a few more words about what fruitfulness could amount to in this context: 
a) As already mentioned, an explication should help to identify novel approaches and 
distinguish approaches in a field. This can be achieved by focusing on the specification of or 
shift in the understanding of problems recognized in a community, and by analyzing the 
research systems and the methodological schemata they instantiate. 
b) Given the prominence of the practice turn in recent history, philosophy and social studies of 
science, the explication of approach should help to pursue this agenda. The suggested 
definition does so as it focuses on methodological schemata and their implementation in 
research systems. It also emphasizes the fact that science (esp. biology) is often organized 
around problems rather than overarching theories as shown for developmental biology by 
Alan Love (2014). 
c) Finally, I would argue that an analytic category, in this case a philosophical concept of 
approach, should serve not only the description, classification or explanation of the practice 
of researchers, but also its interpretation and understanding. How this goal is achieved will 
become clearer when discussing the philosophical implications of the concept (see below). 
The value for HPSS 
I hope that the fruitfulness of the newly introduced analytic category will become clearer as I turn to 
its significance for questions pertaining to the historical, social, and philosophical analysis of science. 
History 
The suggested explication of approach facilitates the micro-historical study of a researcher or group. 
It structures the analysis, by highlighting the two components of the explicatum, problems and 
methods, and their respective characterizations in terms of goal schemata, questions, and specified 
aspects of phenomena on the one hand, and methodological schemata and research systems on the 
other hand. 
In this way, analysts become sensitive to how the differential reproduction of experimental (or, more 
generally, research systems), or the more dramatic hybridization of such systems relate to re-
formulations of a problem or new characterization of phenomena (Rheinberger 1997). The elements 
coming together in an approach, both conceptual and material, can be traced back by paying 
attention to the biographical, disciplinary trajectory of researchers or the various fields from which 
they might draw as outsiders. Approaches often develop in various stages over the course several 
sub-projects resulting in various publications. The explication then helps to track the extensions, 
drawbacks, and revisions in the articulation of an approach.  
When concrete research projects exhibit considerable novelty in their approach, they can function as 
a paradigm - in the sense of exemplar - for other research endeavors. Often a new field emerges 
from a new account to problems recognized in previously existing fields, and fields diversify when 
approaches diversify. In this way an analysis of approaches connects micro-histories with macro-
histories concerning the dynamics of the formation of research fields. 
Sociology 
Regarding the social analysis of science, the usefulness of the category of an approach can be 
specified as follows:  
Part of the work of developing an approach is to justify and promote it in the light of other 
approaches. Thus, researchers not only position themselves towards the subject matter of their 
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research, but thereby also towards projects by other researchers or their own previous projects. By 
distinguishing their approach from others, researchers thus position themselves within or towards 
one or several communities. To address this aspect, it is helpful to turn to position theory as it has 
been advanced by Rom Harré and co-workers. This makes clear that positioning always involves 
defining a relation: for instance, the new generation vs the old generation etc. Furthermore, this 
account emphasizes the re-description involved in interpreting problems and how this goes hand in 
hand with arguing for what should be seen as relevant and thus be supported by a community or 
other actors such as funders. As van Langenhove and Harré write: 
Adopting a ‘position’ involves the use of rhetorical devices by which oneself and 
other speakers are presented as standing in various kinds of relations. […] In 
discursive processes two essential things happen: (i) people position themselves 
and others and (ii) people present versions of the material and social world by 
means of rhetorical redescriptions. (van Langenhove and Harré 1993, p. 3) 
An analysis in terms of approaches can also facilitate analysis in terms of controversies, which 
constitutes a central method for the sociological and philosophical study of science (REF). 
Researchers can disagree about the most appropriate approach but also see each other as 
contributing in a pluralistic and complementary manner to addressing the problem by pursuing 
different approaches. In such situations it crucial to understand not only the differences in the 
respective research systems, but also in the interpretations of the problem which they are meant to 
address. 
Philosophy 
Theoretical representations have been described as perspectival, in that they denote aspects of the 
world to the expense of others (Giere 2006). This philosophical concept is built on a perceptual 
metaphor; perception, however, remains distanced. Furthermore, philosophical discussions of 
perspective typically emphasize theory (Massimi 2018). 
The term approach itself has a metaphorical origin; as a verb it most often means “come nearer to”. 
Thus, unlike the perceptual metaphor of perspective, the notion of an approach emphasis an agent’s 
involvement and embodied interaction. To approach an object implies to move towards it from a 
given vantage point and direction and to access it in a specific and selective manner. That 
phenomena are understood from a theoretical point of view requires that they are approached and 
made accessible from a ‘point of action’ in the first place. An approach enables and limits, but also 
orients a theoretical perspective. Hence the concept of an approach an approach introduced by the 
explication promises to bring current discussions of perspectivism closer to scientific practice. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, this paper argues that it is useful for historians, sociologists as well as philosophers of 
science to pick up central actors’ categories and turn them into analysts’ categories, i.e., into 
conceptual tools that can be used to trace, explain, or understand processes of knowledge 
production in the sciences. Furthermore, the philosophical method of explication is shown to be 
adequate to the task of facilitating this transformation of categories. Finally, the actors’ category of a 
research approach is subjected to an explication in order to derive a concept useful for historical, 
sociological, and philosophical analysis of science. The category is central to many empirical sciences. 
It is shown that the explication of the concept of an approach serves the goals of analysts from the 
history, sociology ad philosophy of science. While the ideas presented here have been derived from 
the analysis of research in the biological sciences, it can be expected, that the suggested explication 
will be useful also in the analysis of other sciences. 
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